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J.C. SONNEKUS*

South Africa's Transition to Democracy

and the Rule of Law
I. The Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights
The cornerstone of the new democracy in South Africa after the historic free
election of April 27, 1994, is chapter 3 of the new Constitution. This chapter
on fundamental rights should guarantee that the prerequisites for a democratic
South Africa will be fulfilled by the new government.
The notion that a society should be ruled by the law can be traced to medieval
thinking, although the modern notion of a Rechtsstaat goes to the credit of the
German legal science of the second half of the nineteenth century. It was the
publications of jurists such as Stein, Bahr, Gneist, and Stahl who formulated
clearly: "Der Staat soll Rechtsstaat seyn. Das ist die Losung und ist in Wahrheit
der Entwicklungstrieb der neueren Zeit. [The state should be governed by the
rule of law. That is the solution and is the development goal of the new time.]"'
One of the principal goals of the allies in World War II was the restoration
of the rule of law to Europe. This goal encompassed more than merely the
maintenance of law and order, for law and order can be maintained effectively
by an oppressive minority that totally disregards human rights. The notion of

Note: The American Bar Association grants permission to reproduce this article, or a part thereof,
in any not-for-profit publication or handout provided such material acknowledges original publication
in this issue of The InternationalLawyer and includes the title of the article and the name of the
author.
*B.A. Law, LL.B., LL.M. (RAU), Drs. Iur., LL.D. (Leiden); Professor of Private Law, Law
Faculty, Rand Afrikaans University, Johannesburg.
1. FRIEDRICH J. STAHL, DIE PHILOSOPHIE DES RECHTS-DIE STAATSLEHRE UND DIE PRINCIPIEN
137 (3d ed.); see also WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
121, 133, 195, 196 (1923); A.A.H. STRUYCKEN, ADMINISTRATIE OF RECHTER-BESCHOUWINGEN
OVER DE MODERNE RECHTSTAATSGEDACHTE 5-10 (1910); J.C. Van der Walt, The Role of Constitutional Law in a Changing South Africa, 1989 JOURNAL OF SOUTH AFRICAN LAW [TSAR] 390; B.
Beinart, The Rule of Law, 1962 ACTA JURIDICA 99; D.M. Davis, The Rule of Law and the Radical
Debate, 1981 ACTA JURIDICA 65, 78-79.
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the rule of law takes the form of the supremacy of certain fundamental laws.2
Modem constitutions based on the continental rather than the British model 3 stress
the value of certain primary rights. The presence of these rights in a constitution
is supposed to guarantee permanence of their applicability, regardless of the
incumbent government.
Although the details of the individual perception of fundamental rights may
differ from constitution to constitution, the independence of the judges of the
higher courts is the crux of any effective rule of law. The judiciary should be
free from interference by the administration and control by the parliament, or
even worse, by a political party. 4 The conclusion of a colloquium held at the
University of Chicago on "The Rule of Law as Understood in the West" was
that the rule of law is the instrument of organized society to create a community
in which a person may fulfil himself by the full development of his capacities
unhampered by arbitrary government intervention. 5 Constitutionalism is "a government of laws and not of men. The very basis of the6 idea of limited government
is that sovereignty vests in the individual citizen."
The rule of law is the antithesis to arbitrary and despotic forms of government
that during this century have ruined the lives of so many people in the Soviet
Union and its satellite states, in parts of Asia, and notably, in Africa. The impartial
judiciary in the new South Africa must act as watchdog and guard the delicate
embryo of a developing democracy in this subregion of an Africa not renowned
for its long-standing democratic traditions. This article touches on some aspects
of the "hardware" put in place by the new South African Interim Constitution.
As in the new computer age, however, the hardware alone does not necessarily
determine the success of the operation. Rather, the software used in conjunction
with the available hardware enables the operators to accomplish the set goals.
In the case of the new South Africa, the success of the new democratic operation
will ultimately depend on the will and determination of its peoples to make
successful use of the constitutionally guaranteed values. The fundamental rights
enshrined in the Constitution must never be seen as Teilhaberechte [rights of a
junior partner that can be ignored] only to be acknowledged by the government
of the day as long as it is politically expedient to do so.7
2. See ANTHONY S. MATTHEWS. FREEDOM, STATE SECURITY AND THE RULE OF LAW-DILEMMAS OF THE APARTHEID SOCIETY 9-13 (1986).

3. The Magna Carta can be considered the departing point in regards to the perception of the
rule of law.
4. Cf. the influence of Charles Louis de Montesquieu's premise on the separation of powers
and the independence of the judiciary in L'EsPRIT DES Lois [THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS] (1748).
5. Cf. Arthur L. Goodhart, The Rule of Law and Absolute Sovereignty, 106 U. PA. L. REv.
943 (1958).
6. P. Oliver, Constitutionalismandthe New South African Constitution, in BIRTH OF ACONSTITUTION 50, 55-56 (B. De Villiers ed., 1994).
7. "De grondrechten zijn 'Ausgrenzungen.' [The fundamental rights mentioned in the constitution limit on an exclusive basis the powers of the state.]" See H.J. Van Eikema Hommes, De Materisle
Rechtsstaatidee, 1978 TSAR 42, 47.
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TI. The Point of Departure in the New South Africa
One of the first sections of the new South African Interim Constitution states
that this Constitution shall be the supreme law of the Republic and any law or
act inconsistent with its provisions shall, unless otherwise provided expressly or
by necessary implication in this Constitution, be of no force and effect to the
extent of the inconsistency.'
The supremacy of the Constitution stands in direct contrast to the previous
administration system, where, in accordance with the British tradition that
applied since the British War at the beginning of this century, parliament was
sovereign and above the law. South Africa is now a democratic, constitutional
state. All three branches of government, legislative, executive, and the judicial, are bound by the Constitution's provisions. The courts, and the constitutional court in particular, can test the validity of any state action for legality
and legitimacy. The federal character of the new South Africa, with the division
of powers between central and federal government, can also be overseen by
the courts. 9 For the legal fraternity this exposure opens new horizons and job
opportunities.
A.

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

According to section 7, the fundamental rights chapter" will be binding on
all legislative and executive branches of state at all levels of government and
will apply to all law in force, all administrative decisions taken and all acts
performed during the operation of this Constitution. 1 This mandate that state
agencies are bound by this chapter indicates that this chapter is not intended to have
direct, third-party applicability as is the case with the Namibian Constitution. 2
If read with section 35(3) of the new Constitution, the situation may develop
comparably to the German indirekte Drittwerkung [indirect horizontal effect or

8. S. AFR. CONST. § 4(1) (1993). It is unfortunate that within the first 100 days of operation,
the new government had already experienced the need to pass four amendments to the Constitution,
somehow making a mockery of the notion of a supreme law not subjected to numerous amendments.
9. It is, in general, with the exception of Switzerland, typical of a federal constitutional state
that the courts do have such a testing capacity. See S.W. COUWENBERG, GEZAG EN VRUIHEIDINLEIDING IN DE CONSTITUTIONELE RECHTS-EN ONTWIKKELINGSTHEORIE 48 (1991). With regard
to the Swiss position, see A. AFFOLTER, GRONDZUGE DES SCHWEIZERISCHEN STAATSRECHT 103-05

(1923). See also D. BASSON. SOUTH AFRICA'S INTERIM CONSTITUTION xxiv (1994) ("[T]he interim
Constitution ... does not introduce a classic system of federal government" but "the possibility
exists that the Constitutional Court may carve out a niche for provincial competence.").
10. S. AFR. CONST., supra note 8, ch. 3.
11. Id.§ 7(1)-(2).
12. Section 5 of the Namibian Constitution explicitly regulates that the fundamental rights and
freedoms enshrined in that section shall be respected by "all natural persons and legal persons in
Namibia."

See D.

MULLER, VERFASSUNG VON NAMIBIA: ETHNISCHE VIELFALT UND ELEMENTE

EINES MINDERHEITENSCHUTZES

(1992).
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"spreading"] so that the courts will have to take note of fundamental rights when
interpreting common law. 3
Under the new Constitution, natural persons enjoy fundamental rights protection, as in some Anglo-American jurisdictions; and juristic persons enjoy the
same protection as natural persons. 4 This protection is in accordance with the
German origins of this chapter and the explicit provisions in Section 35(1), and
serves as a clear indicator of the foreign decisions that should be used to interpret
the ambit of some of these principles in the future.
Although the Constitution's explicit mention of this mode of interpretation is
welcomed, it is to be hoped that the interpreting courts will give a local interpretation to the relevant issues, recognizing the unique South African situation, rather
than blindly applying foreign decisions. 16
Applicants may apply for relief that includes a declaration of rights applicable
either to the applicant personally or to any person, class, association of persons,
or the public at large with whom the applicant associates. 7
1. Equality
For any real democracy, of paramount importance is that all peoples within
the democracy should enjoy equal opportunities. According to section 8, every
person shall have the right to equality before the law and to equal protection of
the law.'8 No person shall be unfairly discriminated against, directly or indirectly,
and, without derogating from the generality of this provision, on one or more
of the following grounds in particular: race, gender, sex, ethnic or social origin,
color, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture,
or language.' 9

13. G. Diamond, Voorlopigeaantekeningeoorhoofstuk3van die Grondwet, 1994 DEREBus [DR)
380-84. On the application and interpretation of similar rules in German law, see Bundesarbeitsgericht
(Federal Labor Court), judgment of May 5, 1957 (NJW 1957, 1688-90); Bundesverfassungsgericht
(Federal Constitutional Court), judgment of Jan. 15, 1958 (BVerfGE 7, 198-230); Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court), order of Feb. 9, 1994 (NJW 1994, 1147-49).
14. "Juristic persons shall be entitled to the rights contained in this Chapter where, and to the
extent that, the nature of the rights permits." S. AFR. CONST., supra note 8, § 7(3).
15. "[A] court of law shall promote the values which underlie an open and democratic society
based on freedom and equality and shall, where applicable, have regard to public international law
applicable to the protection of the rights entrenched in this Chapter, and may have regard to comparable
foreign case law." Id.§ 35(1); see SOUTH AFRICA'S CRIsis OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (R.A.
Licht & B. de Villiers eds., 1994) [hereinafter SOuTH AFRICA'S CRISIS].
16. Cf. Diamond, supra note 13, at 384. But see the views of Mureinik and Asmal, infra note
83. See also T.L. Pangle, South Africa, Viewed Through the Eyes of the American Constitution, in
SouTm AFRICA'S CRISIS, supra note 15.

17. For example, (i) a person acting in his or her own interest; (ii) an association acting in the
interest of its members; (iii) a person acting on behalf of another person who is not in a position to
seek such relief in his or her own name; (iv) a person acting as a member of or in the interest of
a group or class of persons; or (v) a person acting in the public interest.
18. S. AFR. CONST., supra note 8, § 8(1).
19. Id.§ 8(2).
VOL. 29, NO. 3
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The Constitution of the former Republic of Bophuthatswana ° had a similarly
worded equality section. This section has been used to interpret, inter alia, regulations governing the 1992 expulsion of pregnant students from a college by the
superior court. 2' The court held that, in the idiom used by American courts
regarding quasi-suspect classifications, the particular regulation did not bear a
"fair, substantial, natural, reasonable or just relation" 22 to any of the mentioned
objects or purposes. The South African courts will probably apply the equality
principle along these lines.
The shifting of the burden of proof in subsection 8(4) will be an important
tool in the hands of the interpreting judiciary: "Primafacieproof of discrimination
on any of the grounds specified in subsection (2) shall be presumed to be sufficient
proof of unfair discrimination as contemplated in that subsection, until the contrary is established." 23
Unfortunately, the sound principle of nondiscrimination is undermined by the
very next subsection: "This section shall not preclude measures designed to
achieve the adequate protection and advancement of persons or groups or categories of persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination, in order to enable their
full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms." 24 This subsection will most
probably be used for what is known euphemistically as "affirmative action" or
discrimination in reverse.
South African universities used to base student admissions on academic merit
alone, without regard for color. During the last two decades, due to the educational
boycott instigated by organizations within the fold of the mass movements (United
Democratic Front (UDF); African National Congress (ANC); and South African
Communist Party (SACP)), the educational standard of the majority of black
students deteriorated to the point of nonexistence. The new government has,
however, already announced that according to their interpretation of this subsection, it will enact by an act of parliament that every university must accommodate
persons as students who may not comply with the usual standard of education
necessary for academic studies but who must now be advanced to achieve equal
enjoyment of all rights and freedoms.
Section 32(a) provides that every person shall have the right to basic education
and to equal access to educational institutions. South African universities, unlike
their Dutch counterparts, are traditionally separate, independent, legal entities

20. Annexed by the South African government military forces in total disregard for the legal
position of the independent country legally recognized by the South African Government up to March
12, 1994. See Mangope v. Van der Walt, 1994 3 S.A. 850 (BGD) 862.
21. Mfolo v. Minister of Education, Bophuthatswana, 1992 3 S.A. 181 (B).
22. Mfolo case 186H.
23. S.AFR. CONST., supra note 8, § 8(4).
24. Id. § 8(3)(a).
FALL 1995
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enjoying juristic personality. 2 5 Although up to 70 percent of the budget of the
universities may be subsidized by the central fiscus, the state has, in the past,
respected the independence and autonomy of the university councils and governing bodies to run the universities along internationally acceptable lines with the
emphasis on academic merit.
Academic freedom and university autonomy relate to the mission of a university
to pursue knowledge and understanding through research and teaching.2 6 Autonomy is usually described as the independence of a university with regard to
matters related to its mission, viz academic matters." In Germany, 28 the United
States, and Britain, legal rules have been formulated to regulate the relationship
between universities and academics on the one hand and the government on the
other hand to protect these valuable assets of a free society. While an entrenched
bill of rights2 9 ought to guarantee these values in the new South Africa, the
opposite has happened. Although various proposals were tabled regarding academic freedom, 3 ° and a section modelled after the German article 5(3) was considered, the bill of rights did not materialize in that form.
Section 14(1) contains, ostensibly as an afterthought, a reference to academic
freedom, but does not explicitly include academic autonomy: "Every person
shall have the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion,
which shall include academic freedom in institutions of higher learning." The
same can be said of the reference in section 15(1) to freedom of expression:
"Every person shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression, which
shall include freedom of the press and other media, and the freedom of artistic
creativity and scientific research."
On the insistence of the new government, subsections 247(2) and (3) were
added to the Constitution, despite vehement protest from some universities. The
national government may alter the rights, powers, and functions of the controlling
bodies of universities by agreement of the parties resulting from bona fide negotia25. Cf. the different University Acts, e.g., Universities Act 61 of 1955; Private Act on the
Rhodes University Act 15 of 1949; University of the Orange Free State Act 21 of 1949; Potchefstroom
University Act 19 of 1950; University of Stellenbosh Act 37 of 1959; Rand Afrikaans University
Act 51 of 1966, etc. On the position of the Dutch Universities, see C.J. A. DE RANITZ, DE RECHTSPOSITIE VAN DE RIKSUNIVERSITEIT EN VAN HAAR ELEMENTEN 29-76 (1938).
26. See E.F.J. Malherbe, Die Regsbeskerming Van Akademiese Vryheid en Universiteitsoutonomie in 'n Nuwe Suid-Afrika, 1993 TSAR 359.
27. See E.F.J. Malherbe, 'n Handves van Regte en Onderwys, 1993 TSAR 686-708.
28. "Kunst und Wissenschaft, Forschung und Lehre sind Frei. Die Freiheit der Lehre entbindet
nicht von der Treue zur Verfassung." See GRUNDGESETZ [Basic Law] art. 5(3) (F.R.G.).
29. This position in the Spanish Constitution is stated as such: "The autonomy of universities
is recognized under the terms which the law provides." CONSTITUcI6N § 27(10) (Spain). This
position in the Portuguese Constitution states: "The universities shall be autonomous with respect
to the adoption of their rules and shall enjoy scientific, pedagogical, administrative and financial
autonomy, all in accordance with the law." CONSTITUIcAO § 76(2) (Port.). See also CONSTITUCiON
POLITICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS § 3 (viii); Malherbe, supra note 26, at 379 nn. 197-99.
30. Cf. the proposals from the Law Commission, Inkatha, and the National Party, in Malherbe,
supra note 26, at n.204.
VOL. 29, NO. 3
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tion. If an agreement is not reached, the national and provincial governments
are not precluded from altering the powers of governing bodies in various schools
as well as the controlling bodies of universities. These bodies can only respond
by challenging the validity of such alterations in terms of this Constitution.
The universities are afraid that a new government could use these provisions to
alter admission requirements to enable underqualified persons to enter the universities and to compel the universities to award degrees regardless of the students' real
merit. Awarding a higher education degree to a student merely because that person
was enrolled at an institution for the required term borders on deceit.
The prestigious academic institutions in Western Europe and America must
show their true colors and protest to the new government if unsuitable students,
armed with these worthless certificates, apply for post-graduate research fellowships or seats at these universities.
A document published under the auspices of the Centre for Education Policy
Development stated that "National policy [is directed] to achieve enhanced African 31 access" to universities. 321 Special attention will be directed towards those
historically white (Afrikaans) universities where enrollments are below capacity
due to entrance criteria that required prospective students to have certain academic
qualifications.
If equal access is read to mean enhanced African access, not much will be left
of the nondiscrimination clause in the bill of rights. The universities will be compelled
to rethink their position regarding their Western-oriented curricula and the maintenance of acceptable academic standards. That this shift of academic focus will most
probably materialize can be gleaned from the same document's anticipating centrally
managed "coordinated access" according to a central plan,33 an approach that will
destroy the historical autonomy of the universities as academic institutions. 34
2. The Fundamental Rights of Children
Section 30(1) guarantees that every child shall have the right to: (a) a name
and nationality as from birth; (b) parental care; (c) security, basic nutrition, and
basic health and social services; (d) freedom from neglect or abuse; and (e)
31. The term "African" refers not to all people born in Africa, but must be read to refer only
to black people.
32. HIGHER EDUCATION TASK TEAM, CENTER FOR EDUCATION POLICY DEVELOPMENT, Proposed Implementation Plan at 11 (1994).
33. If the overtones of "centralized planning" in the political manifesto and RDP (Reconstruction
and Development Program) of the ANC, as echoed in the new Constitution, are actually implemented
by the government, it will be the task of the judiciary to guard the newly found democracy. Cf.
Sabine's remark: "No quality of Lenin's political thought was more constant than his preference
for centralized organization, or, put negatively, his distrust of any kind of federalism, coalition, or
even alliance, if the last threatened his freedom of action." GEORGE H. SABINE, A HISTORY OF
POLITICAL THEORY 862 (3d ed. 1961).
34. Cf. "The present 'free-market' approach will result in chaos as demand increases. Some
form of coordination of admissions, linked to growth projections, must be investigated immediately."
HIGHER EDUCATION TASK TEAM, supra note 32, Policy Implications at 5.
FALL 1995
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freedom from exploitative labor practices or work that is hazardous or harmful
to his or her education, health, or well-being. For the purpose of this section,
a child shall mean a person under the age of eighteen years; and in35all matters
concerning such child, his or her best interests shall be paramount.
Unfortunately, the parties were not able to reach a consensus on the inclusion
of a fundamental right for the protection of the family or marriage. The mere
reference to a child's right to a name does not say much about the problem of
whether the name should be the father's, the mother's, or the parent's agreed-on
married name.36
37

B.

LIMITATION

The rights entrenched in chapter 3 may be limited by law,38 provided that such
limitation is reasonable, justifiable, necessary, and does not negate the essential
content of the right in question. Except as provided for in subsection (1) or any
other provision of the Constitution, no law, whether a rule of the common law,
customary law, or legislation, shall limit any right entrenched in this chapter.39
The entrenchment of rights in this chapter shall not be construed as denying the
existence of any other rights or freedoms recognized or conferred by common
law, customary law, or legislation to the extent that they are not inconsistent
with this chapter. 4° And finally, section 33(4) of the Constitution states that "This
Chapter shall not preclude measures designed to prohibit unfair discrimination
by bodies and persons other than those bound in terms of section 7(1)."
C.

INTERPRETATION

In interpreting the provisions of chapter 3, a court of law must "promote the
values which underlie an open and democratic society based on freedom and
equality and shall, where applicable, have regard to public international law
applicable to the protection of the rights entrenched in this chapter, and may
have regard to comparable foreign case law.41
35. S. AFR. CONST., supra note 8, § 30(3).
36. See J.C. Sonnekus, Naamsvoering binne die Familiereg- Versoenbaar met Fundamentele
Menseregte?, 1993 TSAR 608-36; Cf. the difference between Anglo-American and Germanic legal
systems with regard to the importance attached to the family name. HAILSHAM OF ST. MARYLEBONE,
XXII HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 633, § 1018 (4th ed. 1979); PHILLIMORE EN FRY, CHANGES
OF NAME xvii (1905); WACKE, MONCHENER KOMMENTAR BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH § 1355,

RdNr 1 ev (1989); SCHOTr, FESTSCHRIFT HEGNAUER 471-92 (1986); Kruiger, Die Name der Frau
nach bargerlichem Recht, 1957 AcP 232; Schwenzer, Namensrecht im Oberblick, 1991 FAMRZ

390, 392.
37. S. AFR. CONST., supra note 8, § 33.
38. Cf. the interpretation given to a similar wording in the European Convention on Human
Rights, in Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 245 (1979/80), quoted in Diamond,
supra note 13, at 383.
39. S. AFR. CONST., supra note 8, § 33(2).
40. Id. § 33(3).
41. Id. § 35(1).
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South African lawyers and courts are accustomed to interpreting laws according
to set rules of interpretation formulated to disclose the meaning or intention of
the legislature. "Scire namque leges non est, verba earum tenere, sed vim ac
potestatem. 4' The rules of interpretation are to a great extent still uncodified
and buried in the various writings of the old writers of the Roman Dutch law
of the 17th century as interpreted by the courts. 3 According to section 35 of the
Constitution, courts will have to make a value judgment in every case. This
discretion will be totally foreign to the classical Roman-Dutch principle that44South
African judges do not sit in courts of equity, as in some English courts.
No law that limits any of the rights entrenched in this chapter shall be constitutionally invalid solely because the wording used prima facie exceeds the limits imposed
in this chapter, provided such a law is reasonably capable of a more restricted interpretation that does not exceed such limits. If so, such law shall be construed as
having a meaning in accordance with the more restricted interpretation.45 Until an
applicable rule of law has been tested by a competent court and found to be unconstitutional, it remains in force. 6 Any other interpretation will be to the detriment of
legal certainty, which is a sine qua non for any orderly society. 7
In the interpretation of any law and in the application and development of the
common law and customary law, a court shall have due regard to the spirit,
purport, and objects of this chapter.48
D.

THE IMPLICATION FOR LEGAL PRACTICE OF THE
BILL OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

South African lawyers schooled in the uncodified Roman-Dutch law will have
to get used to the idea that every possible aspect of state action may be tested against
the bill of rights. For comparative lawyers this development will be a boon in their
practices. Their ability to be at home in various legal systems will be valued. Human-rights jurisprudence is the most international legal discipline. Legal practitioners will have to take note of developments and rulings in international forums,

42. DIG. 1, 3, 17 ("To know the laws is not to observe their mere words, but their force and
power."); F.C. Von Savigny, Rekonstruction des dem Gesetze inwohnenden Gedankens, in I SYSTEM
DES HEUTIGEN ROMISCHEN RECHTS 213 (1840).

43. Cf.L.C. STEYN, UITLEG VAN WETrE 2 (S.I.E. Van Tonder ed., 1981).
44. Cf. the well-known dictum of the South African appellate division: "Equity could not override
a clear rule of law." Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v. de Ornelas, 1988 3 S.A. 580 (A)
606A.
45. S.APR. CONST., supra note 8, § 35(2).
46. See S v. Maponya case CC 129/94 (unreported (T)); see also J.D. Van der Vyver, The
Meaning of 'Law' in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 111 S. AFR. L.J. 569, 572
(1994).
47. See B. ROTHERS, DAS UNGERECHTE AN DER GERECHTIGKEIT-DEFIZITE EINES BEGRIFFS
107 (1991) ("Notwendige Bedingung der Gerechtigkeit und elementarer Bestandteil rechtsstaatlich
verstandener Justizgarantie ist die Rechtsicherheit").
48. S.AFR. CONST., supra note 8, § 35(3).
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such as the European Commission on Human Rights, the European Court of Human
Rights, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, and the jurisprudence
of individual jurisdictions other than the Commonwealth countries. Advocates and
attorneys will similarly have to acquaint themselves with new texts as well as foreign law reports. International human rights instruments, such as the United Nations Human Rights Covenants, will be more than useful reading.
Haysom pointed out that the interests of a client may be drastically affected
by litigation in which the client is not a party. 49 An attorney will continuously
have to monitor litigation before the courts in order to intervene directly as an
interested party or as an amicus curiae.50 Attorneys will have to file opinions
and evidence to guide the courts in accordance with the interests of the client.
Whether the new rules will make provision for such briefs is as yet unclear, but
according to Haysom some provision to protect the interests of parties not before
the court that goes beyond existing rights of third-party intervention will have
to be made. 5' These provisions are necessary, because the consequences of constitutional litigation are more far-reaching and may affect the rights of diverse
groups and individuals who were not parties to a particular case.52
The bill of rights mandates that in the interpretation and application of any
law, including common law and customary law, the courts shall consider the
"spirit, purport and objects" of the bill of rights. Thus, it will likely cast a
shadow over all aspects of commercial and civil litigation and will require close
scrutiny of all existing legal documents to ascertain its impact on the validity or
interpretation of the individual provisions.
South African legal practitioners must acquaint themselves as soon as possible
with this new field. Otherwise, foreign legal experts will be called on to interpret
the applicability of the various norms against the background of the new Constitution. To avoid this inherent danger, practitioners must develop a working knowledge of human rights jurisprudence.
The first series of reported decisions on the effect of the new Constitution
concerned the interpretation and scope of section 23, which deals with access
to information: "Every person shall have the right of access to all information
held by the state or any of its organs at any level of government in so far as such
information is required for the exercise or protection of any of his or her rights."
South African criminal procedure still uses an accusatorial, adversary system,

49. N. Haysom, The Bill of FundamentalRights: Implicationsfor Legal Practice, 1994 DR 125.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. As to group actions and the relevant civil procedure implications, see W. le R. De Vos,
Groepsgedingvoering in die Verenigde State van Amerika ingevolge reel 23 van die FederaleRekls
insake Siviele Proses, 1984 TSAR 263; 'n Groepsgeding vir Suid-Afrika, 1985 TSAR 296.
53. See S v. Fani, 1994 3 S.A. 619 (E); Qozeleni v. Minister of Law & Order, 1994 3 S.A.
625 (E); Mazele v. Minister of Law & Order, 1994 3 S.A. 380 (E); S v. James, 1994 3 S.A. 881
(E); S v. Smith, 1994 3 S.A. 887 (SE).
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as opposed to an inquisitorial, procedural system used in many western countries.
The difference in disclosure and pleading procedures between the two systems
must be kept in mind when applying this principle of access to information.
Otherwise, the whole criminal procedure can be slanted to the detriment of the
community at large if it results in criminals being acquitted because their counsel
are able to turn evidence accumulated by the investigating officers. De Villiers
hoped that
the principles ... are adjusted to the extent that the prosecution (and thereby the broader
public) receives some form of quid pro quo in that accused persons be compelled to reveal
their defenses at the commencement of their trials. In this manner evidence could be limited, valuable court time saved, and expenses by the public reduced. Accused persons may
also, if genuinely innocent, benefit from revealing their versions at the commencement of
their trials because they may soon after their plea explanations be acquitted
should their
54
versions accord with the information at the disposal of the prosecution.
Not only is the application of the principles contained in chapter 3 a new field
for the practicing lawyers in South Africa, but the meaning of many of the
provisions of the bill of rights is somewhat elusive. Further, the two versions
of the Constitution, the Afrikaans text signed by the state president and the
English text, which according to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa
Amendment Act 2 of 1994, "shall . . . prevail as if it were the signed text,"
contain several disparities .s In general, it will be sound practice if the "wider"
text, which affords the subjects a more beneficial arrangement, should prevail.
Provisions relating to the right to economic activity or to the meaning of unfair
discrimination can have various implications for economic and social life. Haysom
refers to the following by way of example: 56 Will the manufacturers of steel

cans be able to challenge the constitutional validity of a regulation that unfairly
discriminates against them by favoring the manufacturers of aluminum cans? Do
restrictions on Sunday trading hours impair a company's right to religious freedom? The meaning given to any of the fundamental rights cannot be ascertained
from a simple textual reading, but will instead take its cue from an evolving but
distinctive approach to the interpretation of human rights provisions.
The legal profession will have a prominent task in protecting and developing
the bill of fundamental rights. In addition to the importance of these rights to a
just and stable society, the rights will affect almost all aspects of legal practice.
Attorneys will be required to advise their clients on the likely impact of the bill
in regard to a wide range of social, political, and business concerns. Attorneys
will be eligible to sit on the Constitutional Court and will be represented in the
Judicial Service Commission. Moreover, attorneys will probably have rights of
54. J.W.S. De Villiers, The Interim Bill of FundamentalHuman Rights: A Prosecutor'sPerspective, 1995 TSAR 133; see Harold Rudolph, The 1993 Constitution-Some Thoughts on Its Effect on
Certain Aspects of Our System of Criminal Procedure, 111 S. AFR. L.J. 497, 506-13 (1994).
55. Van der Vyver, supra note 46, at 569.
56. Haysom, supra note 49, at 129.
FALL 1995

670

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

audience in the Constitutional Court itself. Indeed, the bill of fundamental rights
may even spur an attack on some of the irrational features of the divided bar.
For all these reasons, attorneys must take the bill of rights seriously.

III. The Role of the Different Courts in a New South African Scheme
The new South African Constitution became effective on April 27, 1994,
repealing the whole of the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act, 110 of
1983.57 The new Constitution provides for a Parliament comprising the National
Assembly of four hundred representatives and the Senate consisting of ten representatives of each of the nine new provinces that will form the legislature. Judicial
authority is regulated in chapter 7, and the main innovation is the new Constitutional Court of eleven members with the power to test any act of Parliament
or lesser legislative assembly for compliance with constitutionally guaranteed
fundamental rights. This important innovation diverges from the principle inherited from the British Westminster system in which Parliament was sovereign.
The South African constitutional fathers opted for a mixture of American and
Austrian types of judicial control. The American model5" gives every court of
law testing capacity, while the Austrian example59 reserves the testing capacity
for a single constitutional court. 60 According to the South African Constitution,
only the Constitutional Court has the power to test acts of Parliament; but every
division of the Supreme Court, with the exception of the appellate division, will
have testing powers with regard to all other constitutional matters. 6 1
A.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

62

The Constitutional Court has jurisdiction over all matters relating to the interpretation, protection, and enforcement of the Constitution's provisions.63 This
jurisdiction includes: any alleged violation of fundamental right entrenched in
chapter 3;64 any dispute over the constitutionality of any executive or administra57. Act 200 of 1993.
58. Followed in,e.g., Mexico, Australia, Canada, Japan, Greece, Norway, Denmark, and India.
59. Introduced inAustria in 1920 and since followed in Italy, Germany (GRUNDGESETZ [Basic
Law] arts. 93-94), Turkey, and Spain.
60. See Couwenberg, supra note 9, at 50.
61. Within the first 100 days of government, the minister has indicated that the Constitution
will be amended inorder to extend this capacity to the magistrates courts. This extension of authority
was accomplished in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Third Amendment Act No.
13 of 1994, which came into operation retroactively on July 22, 1994.
62. See K.Stassen, Die Tussentydse Grondwet, 1994 DR 282, 761.
63. S.AFR. CONST., supra note 8, § 98(2). "The Constitutional Court shall be the only court
having jurisdiction over a matter referred to insubsection (2), save where otherwise provided in §
101(3) and (6)." Id. § 98(3), amended by Act 13 of 1994, § 3.
64. This provision leaves the question of whether an Act concerning the official status of any
language disregarding the provisions of § 4 that is not included in chapter 3, will be justiciable by
the Constitutional Court.
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tive act or proposal; any inquiry into the constitutionality of any law or proposed
legislation; 65 any dispute of a constitutional nature between organs of state at any
level of government; and jurisdictional questions. 66
The Constitutional Court's decision is binding on all persons and all state
legislative, executive, and judicial organs.67 If the Constitutional Court finds that
any law or any provision thereof is inconsistent with the Constitution, the court
shall declare such law or provision invalid to the extent of its inconsistency.
However, the Constitutional Court may, in the interests of justice and good
government, require Parliament or any other competent authority within a period
specified by the court, to change the law or provision, which shall then remain
in force pending correction or the expiration of the period so specified.68
Unless the Constitutional Court orders otherwise, the declaration of invalidity
of a law or a provision thereof existing at the commencement the Constitution,
shall not invalidate any law in effect before the declaration. However, any laws
passed after such a declaration would be invalid. 69
In the event of the Constitutional Court declares an executive or administrative
act or proposal unconstitutional, the court may order the relevant organ of state
to refrain from such act or conduct, or, to correct the constitutionality of such
act or conduct.7 °
As the Constitutional Court implements constitutionalism, lawyers accustomed
to the old order where Parliament was sovereign will have to adjust their thinking.
The judges of the supreme court have a proud record of excellent judgments on
constitutional matters, including the well-known judgments in the 1950s handed
down by the appellate division when the government of the day manipulated the
Senate to pass certain acts through Parliament. In light of the reported judgments,7'
the sleight-handed way in which the appellate division is excluded from jurisdiction in any constitutional matters can hardly be explained. The vast powers the
Constitutional Court will wield makes its composition of great importance.

65. The Constitutional Court shall exercise jurisdiction in any dispute referred to in
subsection (2)(d) only at the request of the Speaker of the National Assembly, the
President of the Senate or the Speaker of a provincial legislature, who shall make
such a request to the Court upon receipt of a petition by at least one-third of all the
members of the National Assembly, the Senate or such provincial legislature, as the
case may be requiring him or her to do so.
S. AFR. CONST., supra note 8, § 98(9).
66. Id.§ 98(2), amended by Act 13 of 1994, § 3.
67. Id. § 98(4).
68. Id.§ 98(5).
69. Id.§ 98(6).
70. Id.§ 98(7).
71. See Kabinet van die Tussentydse Regering vir Suidwes-Afrika v. Katofa, 1987 1 S.A. 695
(A); Cabinet of the Transitional Government of South West Africa v. Eins, 1988 3 S.A. 369 (A);
Cabinet for the Territory of South West Africa v. Chikane, 1989 1 S.A. 349 (A); S v. Marwane
1982 3 S.A. 717 (A).
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COMPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

The composition of the Constitutional Court and the appointment of its judges
can give some indication of the effectiveness that can be expected from the
new forum. No person is qualified to be appointed president or a judge of the
Constitutional Court unless he or she is a South African citizen, and is fit to be
a judge of the Constitutional Court. He or she must be a judge of the Supreme
Court or be similarly qualified as a practicing advocate, attorney, or lecturer for
at least ten years. A person who has training and experience in the field of
constitutional law may also qualify. 72
Four judges of the Constitutional Court are appointed from among the Supreme
Court judges by the President in consultation with his cabinet and with the Chief
Justice. 73 Six more judges are appointed to the Constitutional Court by the President
74
in consultation with his Cabinet and with the president of the Constitutional Court.
These qualifications should serve as a guarantee that the judges of the highest
court of the new South Africa will be South African citizens with the necessary
legal education, academic background, and practical experience as South African
lawyers and should safeguard against the indiscriminate importation of foreigners
under the disguise of so-called foreign legal experts.
Subject to subsection (6), appointments shall only be made from the recommendations of the Judicial Service Commission of not more than three nominees in
excess of the number required appointees. In the first appointment after the
commencement of the Constitution, the Judicial Service Commission shall submit
a list of ten nominees. An apparent lacuna appears in the Constitution: although
the Judicial Service Commission should make a seemingly binding recommendation to the appointing authorities, the Constitution does not authorize the Judicial
Service Commission to make any recommendation regarding appointment of the
Constitutional Court members.75 If the appointing authorities decide not to accept
a recommendation, they must furnish the reasons for rejection to the Judicial
Service Commission.76
In response, the Judicial Service Commission must submit further recommendations to the appointing authorities. 7
In submitting its recommendations to the appointing authorities, the Judicial
72. S. AFR. CONST., supra note 8, § 99(2).
73. Id. § 99(3).
74. Id. § 99(4).
75. S. AFR. CONST., supra note 8, § 105(2)(b) (limiting the functions of the judicial service
commission, while only mentioning removal from office: "to make recommendations regarding the

removal from office of judges of the Constitutional Court in terms of section 104(4)" (emphasis
added)). By contrast, § 105(2)(a) explicitly mentions, as regards the judges of the supreme court,

the following: "to make recommendations regarding the appointment, removal from office, term of
office and tenure of judges of the Supreme Court in terms of section 104." Id. § 105(2)(a) (emphasis
added).
76. Id. § 99(5)(b).
77. Id. § 99(5)(c).
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Service Commission shall consider the need to constitute a court that is independent, competent, and representative in respect of race and gender. 78 This rule
clearly leaves the possibility that the best legally qualified persons will not necessarily be appointed, only the best representing the various race and gender groupings.79
Subsection (6) explicitly provides that subsection (5) shall not apply to the
first appointment after the commencement of the Constitution of the president
of the Constitutional Court under section 97(2). Thus, the first president is free
to appoint any lawyer he chooses as president of the Constitutional Court. This
lawyer will be vastly influential, despite the safeguards built into the Constitution.
This subsection does distract somewhat from the guarantees implicit in the requirements of evaluation by the independent Judicial Service Commission.

Before his appointment as minister of water affairs and forestry, Kader Asmal
was one of the candidates for the Constitutional Court.80 For Asmal, as for other

human rights jurists in South Africa, 81 the primary role model for interpreting
a bill of rights is the United States or Canada. These jurists are not fluent in

some of the continental languages. They are therefore hampered in interpreting
some of those constitutions, such as the German or the Netherlands constitutions,
although the German Grundgesetz was the role model for some crucial provisions
of the Constitution.
As it turned out, the president appointed a very competent senior lawyer of
long standing, advocate Arthur Chaskalson S.C., as the first president of the
2
8
Constitutional Court.

However, the danger remains that the untainted8 3 lawyers,' given the task of
78. -1d. § 99(5)(d).
79. As it turned out, not a single member of any of the Afrikaans-speaking law faculties was
selected, notwithstanding the fact that some of them wrote most extensively on constitutional matters
and are internationally renowned authorities on the subject-and that is more than can be said of
many a newly appointed member of this Court.
80. Keeva, Defending the Revolution, 1994 A.B.A. J. 50, 60 ("Asmal, who is considered to
be a likely candidate for the Constitutional Court").
81. A. CACHALIA ET AL., FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE NEW CONSTITUTION 9 (1994).
82. His appointment has been hailed by his colleagues, although his close links with the ANC,
as an adviser since 1990, has also been noted. THE STAR, June 9, 1994, at 13.
83. See Keeva, supra note 80, at 58-60 (quoting Asmal and Mureinik). As it turned out, the phrase
"untainted" in no way hampered the appointment, nearly exclusively, of well-known sympathizers of
the new government, although officially the candidates were not required to produce evidence of
their card-bearing membership of the ANC. See P. Laurence, Openness Favors the Faithful, THE
STAR, Oct. 13, 1994, at 16 ("A powerful ANC bloc on the JSC appears to have ensured that the
voting favored candidates who are ANC members above those who are not."). For example, the
appointment of Sachs, a self-confessed, long-standing member of the ANC who was severely criticized
during the open hearing by the Commission for his role in the white-washing of atrocities committed
by the ANC in its camps, leaves room for questions as to the impartiality of some of the new
appointments. Id.
84. The six members appointed after hearings by the Commission are: Kriegler, respected judge
of appeal; Didcott, senior judge of the Natal bench; Sachs, law professor at the University of the
Western Cape; Mokgorro, associate professor at the universities of the Western Cape and BophuthatsFALL 1995
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judicially guaranteeing and defending the new democracy and constitutionally
guaranteed bill of rights, will be interpreting it along American or Canadian lines

even though the bill was written from an entirely different angle.85
C.

THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMISSION1

6

The functions of this new commission8 7 are to make recommendations regarding the appointment, removal from office, term of office, and tenure of judges
of the Supreme Court; to make recommendations regarding the removal from
office ofjudges of the Constitutional Court; and to advise the national and provincial governments on all matters relating to the judiciary and the administration

of justice." Read with section 242(2) the national government must also consult
the Judicial Service Commission on various jurisdictional areas and court structures.

D.

THE COMPOSITION OF THE JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMISSION

The Judicial Service Commission, except for considering matters relating to
a provincial division of the supreme court, consists of seventeen members of

whom at least eight must be formally qualified lawyers: 9 (a) the chiefjustice, who

shall preside at meetings of the Commission; (b) the president of the Constitutional

Court; (c) one judge president designated by the judges president; (d) the minister
responsible for the administration ofjustice or his or her nominee; (e) two practicing advocates designated by the advocates' profession; (f) two practicing attorneys
designated by the attorneys' profession; (g) one professor of law designated by
the deans of all the law faculties at South African universities; (h) four senators
designated en bloc by the Senate by resolution adopted by a majority of at least
two-thirds of all its members; (i) four persons, two of whom shall be practicing
wana; O'Reagan, associate professor at UCT; and Langa, an advocate from Durban. The four
members appointed in consultation with the chief judge are judges Ackermann, Mahomed, Madala,
and Goldstone.
85. "Because the United States has been interpreting bills of rights longer than anybody else
and there is a whole lot more law there than anywhere else, we will be looking at American law
probably more than at any other system." Keeva, supra note 80, at 53.
86. "The Commission shall determine its own procedure, provided that the support of at least
an ordinary majority of all its members shall be required for its decisions." S. AFR. CONST., supra
note 8, § 105(4); see Judicial Service Commission Act No. 9 of 1994.
87. Although the Afrikaans text of the Constitution was signed by the state president and became
the official text of the Constitution, an amendment was brought about by Act No. 2 of 1994, resulting
in the English text now prevailing. With regard to the Judicial Service Commission, this is a happy
outcome of an otherwise tricky question, because in various sections, this commission is referred
to by different names in the Afrikaans text.
88. S. AFR. CONST., supra note 8, § 105(2). "When the Commission performs its functions in
terms of subsection (2)(c), it shall sit without the four senators referred to in subsection (1)(h)." Id.
§ 105(3).
89. In the last-mentioned case it will be augmented by the judge president and the premier of
the relevant province.
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attorneys or advocates, who shall be designated by the President in consultation
with the cabinet; and (j) on the occasion of the consideration of matters specifically
relating to a provincial division of the Supreme Court, the judge president of
the relevant division and the premier of the relevant province.
One of the watchwords of the new South Africa is transparency. 90 Almost
everyone agrees that secret government in this country has been a shield for
iniquity and corruption, and that secrecy is anathema to the new constitutional
order. The Interim Constitution directly supports open government, instructing
the courts to interpret the bill of rights, the centerpiece of the Constitution, and
to promote the values underlying an open and democratic society based on freedom
and equality.
The bill of rights also contains a guarantee of access to official information.
Though imperfectly drafted, this guarantee puts South Africa at the international
frontier of constitutional development. And the Interim Constitution requires the
final Constitution, soon to be written by parliament, to provide for freedom of
information so that open and accountable administration will exist at all levels
of government.
These and other provisions make a commitment to open democracy one of
the great themes of the new Constitution. The first test of that commitment
was the selection of judges during September and October 1994 for the new
Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court is the linchpin of the new Constitution. The Constitution leaves a great many important questions to that court's
judgment. For instance, does the guarantee of gender equality in the bill of rights
outlaw the traditions by which only men can become chiefs in most of the African
tribes?9' Is the current law of defamation compatible with the new constitutional
right of free speech?
On these and many other questions, the judgment of the Constitutional Court
will prevail over that of the government and parliament, making the choice of
Constitutional Court judges critical. Six of the eleven places on the court were
filled by the government from a list of ten nominees supplied by the new Judicial
Service Commission, a body comprising representatives of the government, the
Senate, the bench, and the branches of the legal profession. Unfortunately, loading
the Judicial Service Commission with a clear majority of ANC-inclined
members
92
biased the theoretically sound transparent appointment procedure.
The first great test for open government in the new order was whether the
Judicial Service Commission would operate in the open, and whether it would

90. The Final Arbiters of Justice, THE STAR, May 16, 1994, at 30.
91. The Rain Queen of Mojadzi being the exception to this rule.
92. The ANC bloc consisting of at least the four ANC senators, the ANC minister of justice,
three presidential nominees with clear ANC inclinations, the nominee of the national association of
democratic lawyers, as well Chaskalson, who acted as an advisor to the ANC, forms the single most
important ideological influence in the Commission.
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hold public hearings to consider candidates for the Constitutional Court.9 3 As it
turned out, the Judicial Service Commission opted for a semi-open hearing. The
twenty-five candidates on the short list were each interviewed for an hour by
members of the commission in a session open to the public but closed to the
electronic media.
The Judicial Service Commission is similar to the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, which advises the Senate whether to confirm the President's nominees
for the Supreme Court. The U.S. committee interviews nominees in truly public
proceedings. Nominees are expected to answer questions about their constitutional
philosophies before the media. The effect should be to engage the nation in debate
about the proper criteria for appointment and about the kind of institution the
Supreme Court should be. The hearing of Sachs in Johannesburg during October
1994, for instance, prompted Laurence to write:
Sachs's behavior raised a fundamental question: If he failed to speak out clearly
against the abuse of power [within the ANC] in March 1990 for reasons of expediency,
what guarantee was there that he would not do the same as a judge on a court mandated
to protect human rights? 94
The evidence about Sachs's behavior would probably not have emerged had the
process been closed. Sunlight, said U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, is
the best of disinfectants, and the history of public confirmation hearings proves
it. Yet Sachs was appointed a judge and member of the new South African
Constitutional Court by Mandela on October 13, 1994.
The open hearings can educate the country about the court, and give the country
an opportunity to say what kinds of qualities it expects to find in judges who
can strike down the laws of the highest legislators. These benefits are of the
utmost importance to a country that has never had a constitutional court and
urgently needs a national debate about the kind of institution to which the nation
is aspiring. Views diverge sharply over the kind of court South Africa needs and
over the kind of judges to appoint. All South Africans are entitled to express
themselves on these questions. The major benefits to be reaped by using an open
hearing system are lost if the selection commission is biased to ensure a safe
majority for the governing party's faithful.
Will the new South African Judicial Services Commission also work openly
in the future? Unfortunately, many South African lawyers draw their inspiration
from the British tradition and share its instinctive secretiveness. They can be
expected to raise several impediments to public hearings.
First, they will argue that good candidates might refuse to expose themselves
to public inquiry and be lost to the Constitutional Court. 95 However, a candidate

93. As indicated, the Commission will determine its own procedure and rules according to S.
AFR. CONST., supra note 8, § 105(4).
94. P. Laurence, supra note 83, at 16.
95. The Final Arbiters of Justice, supra note 90, at 30.
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who is unwilling to explain and defend his or her constitutional philosophy to
the nation that will be governed by this philosophy is averse to the openness and
accountability that animates this Constitution. Such a candidate should not be
entrusted with upholding the Constitution. June Sinclair, a very competent lawyer,
was not even put on the short list by the commission despite her willingness to
answer all questions put to her in a frank and open manner that commanded
respect.
The second impediment that will be raised is that public hearings might encourage an examination of a candidate's private life unconnected with judicial ability.
The Judicial Service Commission has met this difficulty by adopting rules to
restrict candidate questioning to topics relevant to judicial office, and to chair
the hearings firmly. This restrictive stance was indeed the position during the
semi-open sessions of the first public hearings of the commission.
The third argument against public hearings is that candidates might be asked
to commit themselves about issues that could arise before them if they were
appointed judges. American nominees usually deal with this difficulty very simply
by declining to answer such questions.
But even if they do answer, no harm is done. Everyone understands that the
answer a candidate gives to an abstract question cannot be binding if the same
issue arises for concrete decision in court. Possibly the most important quality
expected of a judge is a capacity to listen with an open mind to the parties'
arguments, whatever the judge may have thought before the case began.
The Constitutional Court will determine the character of the Constitution. The
selection of its judges will determine the character of the Constitutional Court.
South Africans are entitled to know and scrutinize the candidates, and they are
entitled to know and debate the criteria by which some are chosen for office.
This scrutiny requires a process open to the nation not merely as far as the hearings
are concerned but also in the actual voting for the candidates. The nation must
be able to judge the level of bias and partiality of this important commission that
is responsible for the selection of the members of the Constitutional Court and
the ordinary judges of the supreme court who are entrusted with the fine balance
of rights of the racially diverse citizens of the country.
E.

SUPREME COURT

Since 195096 the highest court or the court of last appeal has been the appellate
division of the supreme court sitting in Bloemfontein. The supreme court used
to have at least a division in every province, although some provinces had more
96. Before 1950, appeals were allowed from the South African courts to the Privy Council in
London, a very unhealthy state of affairs that severely influenced the development of the South
African law. Since the abolition of this appeal possibility, the appellate division has endeavored to
purge the South African law of irreconcilable influences of English law. Appeals to the Privy Council
were abolished by Act No. 16 of 1950.
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than one division.97 The new demarcation of the jurisdictions of the different
divisions of the court is still not finished. For the present, the new section 241(2A)
inserted in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Third Amendment
Act provides for the continuation of the existing divisions of the court. The
only exceptions are the appellate divisions of the previous self-governing and
independent countries that were effectively closed on July 22, 1994.
The new Constitution provides for a supreme court of South Africa, consisting
of an appellate division as well as provincial and local judicial bodies. 98 The
supreme court is to have jurisdiction over cases vested in the supreme court
immediately before the commencement of this Constitution, as well as any further
jurisdiction conferred by this Constitution or by any law. 99
The far-reaching limitation of the jurisdiction of the appellate division is contained in subsection 5: "The Appellate Division shall have no jurisdiction to
adjudicate any matter within the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court." This
limitation was purposely added by the ANC to indicate contempt for the members
of the highest court.'00 It is rather ridiculous to give jurisdiction to a provincial
division but to exclude the jurisdiction of the higher division, the appellate division. 101

Provincial or local divisions of the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction over
the following additional matters, namely any alleged violation of any fundamental
right of chapter 3; any dispute over the constitutionality of any executive or
proposal; any inquiry into the constitutionality of any law or proposal applicable
within its area ofjurisdiction; any dispute of a constitutional nature between local
governments or between a local and a provincial government; any dispute over
the constitutionality of any provincial legislation; jurisdictional questions; and
the determination of any other matters as may be entrusted to it by an act of
parliament. In jurisdictional matters, a provincial or local division of the Supreme
Court shall have the powers of the constitutional court in terms of section 98(5),
(6), (7), (8), and (9) relating to the interpretation, protection, and enforcement
of the Constitution. The appellate division shall not have jurisdiction over matters
within the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court. The parties to a matter falling
outside the jurisdiction of a provincial or local court may agree to provincial or
local jurisdiction provided that a provincial or local division shall not acquire
jurisdiction over any matter referred to in section 102(12).

97. For example, Transvaal, Cape, and Natal.
98. S. AFR. CONST., supra note 8, § 101(1).
99. Id. § 101(2).
100. Keeva, supra note 80, at 58.
101. "The American equivalent would be investing the U.S. District Courts and the U.S. Supreme
Court with constitutional jurisdiction, but barring the courts of appeals from hearing such cases."
Keeva, supra note 80, at 58.
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PRACTICING LAWYERS AS OFFICERS OF THE COURT

South Africa still maintains two separate bars, the bar proper for advocates
of the supreme court and the side bar for attorneys. Members of the side bar
have been barred from appearing in the supreme court. This historical division
has been linked to the British annexation, but can, in reality, be traced to the
early days of Dutch authority at the Cape. The members of the side bar originally
did not need to have the same academic schooling in law that was required for
advocates. Although the historical reasons for this watertight division are still
appropriate because a person can become an attorney after obtaining only one
academic qualification, the B. Proc. degree, and the minimum qualification for
an advocate is two degrees, the second being the LL.B., many people of color
believe they are artificially barred from supreme court practice. All judges of
the supreme court must have been practicing senior advocates before their appointment, and only two persons of color have been appointed as judges of the supreme
court so far.I °0
To widen the possible pool of lawyers who may practice in the supreme court,
the Milne Commission has recommended 10 3 to the minister that legislation be
prepared to create a new class of legal practitioners as attorney-advocates. These
attorney-advocates may include practicing attorneys of at least five years standing
with as a minimum academic qualification, the B. Proc. degree.
The Milne Commission still recommends that the status of senior counsel may
only be conferred upon members of the bar in active practice and at the same
time recommends that supreme court judges be appointed only from amongst
the ranks of senior counsel.'l° Save for the constitutionally regulated appointment
procedure for members of the Constitutional Court, this anachronism means
that no attorney from the side bar nor any senior academic will be eligible for
10 5
appointment to the bench, and thus the legitimacy problem of the all-white bench
remains. Part of the blame for this recommendation should be laid at the door
of the two black lawyers associations that declined an invitation to make any
submission to the Milne Commission.'°6 The new government should rethink
this position and recognize the benefits to the status and quality of the South
African judiciary if competently qualified attorneys are also eligible for appointment to the bench of the supreme court and the expertise of senior academics

102. Justices Mahomed and Madala.
103. This recommendation was released at the end of 1993 and comments were invited on the
report, by the Department of Justice, until April 1994.
104. Milne Commission Report, Main Recommendation, No. 10 & No. 3.
105. There has never been any form of discrimination with regard to female appointments to the
Supreme Court bench, and one of the judges on the court of appeals is the highly respected Mrs.
Justice of Appeal Leonore Van den Heever.
106. The National Association of Democratic Lawyers and the Black Lawyers Association. See
1994 DR 248.
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can be put to valuable use in the courts of appeal. 10 7 In the past, quite a few
extremely well qualified and competent black lawyers have opted for the academic
profession instead of private practice out of a sense of loyalty to the education
of their own peoples. Their expertise can be put to the benefit of the new South
Africa.
IV. The Role of the Commission on the Restitution of Land Rights
Although one of the fundamental rights guaranteed in chapter 3 is the "right
to acquire and hold rights in property"' 08 the very next subsection qualifies this
right with the reference to the deprivation of rights in property that will be
permitted if the deprivation is "in accordance with a law. ' 09
Chaskalson, the president of the Constitutional Court appointed by Mandela,
regrettably considers deprivation of property rights by the state uncompensable
due to his distinction between deprivation and expropriation. " 0 Only formal expropriation will therefore be compensable.
Although expropriation of land is governed by the Expropriation Act,"' this
subsection covers the expropriation of the rights of ownership in immovable
property and property in general, including personal rights to performance as
well as immaterial, incorporeal, property rights, such as rights to patents or a
copyright of an author to his book.
The simple wording of this qualification in the Constitution belies the very
complex behind-the-scenes bargaining that took place during the Kempton Park
negotiations.' 2 The ANC was adamant that the new government must have the
power to legislate on the so-called restitution of property rights. The government
of the day, the National Party, was as insistent that any future restitution legislation
should not undermine the basic principle of the recognition of property rights.' "'
These divergent views resulted in the present wording of, and the separate provisions regarding, the restitution of land rights.
In Southern Africa, the experiences of neighboring countries like Zimbabwe
and Namibia with so-called restitution of property rights bodes ill for the possible
misuse of such legislative powers. The government of the day retains the right
107. See Van der Merwe, AS Continues to Pressfor Attorneys to be Appointed Judges, 1994
DR 709.
108. S. AFR. CoNsT., supra note 8, § 28(1); see D. BASSON, SOUTH AFRICA'S INTERIM CONSTITUTION-TEXT AND NOTES 42-44 (1994).
109. S. AFR. CONST., supra note 8, § 28(2).
110. A. Chaskalson, The Property Clause: Section 28 of the Constitution 1994 S. AFR. J. HUM.
RTS. 131.
111. Expropriation Act No. 63 (1975) as amended.
112. See S. Camerer, PropertyRights and Restitution in the Constitution-A Behind-the-Scenes
Look, 1994 DR 299 ("the inclusion of a property-rights clause... [was) among the hardest-fought
political battles at the World Trade Center").
113. With the exception of Canada, almost every well-known bill of rights includes a propertyrights clause.
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to a thinly disguised "theft" of their political opponents' land. Recently in Zimbabwe, the current president, Mugabe, evicted Sithole and more than 1000 black
tenants from this opposition leader's farm. Mugabe used scores of police and4
government officials to accomplish this seizure just before the coming elections. 11

Section 121 decrees that an act of parliament shall provide for matters relating
to the restitution of land rights, as envisaged in this section and in sections 122
and 123. Forming a Commission on Restitution of Land Rights is instrumental
to any implementation of these restitution provisions. The previous government
created a Commission on Land Allocation with a broadly comparable purpose,
but a new government will most likely reconstitute it.
Subsection 121(2) provides that a person or a community' 15 is entitled to restitution of a right in land from the state if the person or community was dispossessed
of the right at any time after a date to be fixed by the act referred to in subsection

(1); and the dispossession was effected under or to further law that would have
been inconsistent with the prohibition of racial discrimination contained in section
8(2), had that section been in operation at the time of such dispossession. The
legislature, with no regard for the acknowledged principles against retrospectivity,116 provides for an alteration of the existing legal position regardless of the
prevailing legal position's validity.
7
According to customary law, no individual person had or has ownership"
rights in land.118 All land is held by the chief of the tribe for the tribe or
community in a relationship that can be compared to a trust. "9Accordingly,
the wording in the section refers to land rights in contrast to rights of ownership
or dominium.

114. THE STAR, Oct. 24, 1994, at 7.
115. The wording bears on the fact that according to indigenous law only communal rights (in
contrast to private ownership) in immovable property are recognized. See N.J.J. OLIVER ET AL.,
DIE PRIVAATREG VAN DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE BANTOETAALSPREKENDES 486 (1989).
116. Nulla poena sine lege.
117. This is different from the rights of a leasehold in landed property, regulated, with the exception
of leaseholds in the Transkei, by Proclamation R188 of 1969. Ex parte Minister of Native Affairs:
In re Magqabi v. Magqabi and Mnqonyane v. Mnqonyane, 1955 2 S.A. 428 (A). The leaseholds
were sometimes referred to as rights of' 'kraalsite," and any claims to such a right must be substantiated
with a relevant "kraalsite certificate."
118. This obviously does not have any bearing on the entitlement of a person to own land and
to have any of the real rights on land held not under customary law but according to Roman Dutch
Law. See Ndema v. Ndema, 1936 N.A.C. (C&O) 15; Khabane v. Khabane, 1952 N.A.C. (C) 295;
Gudase v. Swales NO, 1956 N.A.C. (NE) 140.
119. In this way, customary law safeguarded, in effect, the rights of certain relatives. A testator
cannot legally dispose of any real rights in his will. The proclamation confers certain rights upon,
for instance, a woman who was the "great" or "principal" wife of the deceased, entitling her to
the use and occupation of the immovable property held under the title granted under the provisions
of the relevant proclamation. "The intention of the proclamation is to safeguard the rights of women
married according to 'native custom,' and in the opinion of this Court their rights and those of their
sons to landed property held under [this] proclamation are not affected by a subsequent Christian
marriage with another woman." Dialo v. Ndwe, 1922 N.A.C. 189.
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According to subsection 3, the date fixed by subsection (2)(a) shall not be a
date earlier than June 19, 1913. "0 In fixing the date at this stage, any open and
still unsettled dispute between the various black tribes regarding land rights falls
outside the scope of this section.
The exclusion under subsection (4)(a) of the applicability of the provisions of
this section to any rights in land expropriated under the Expropriation Act or
any other law incorporating that Act by reference, or the provisions of that act
with regard to compensation, if just and equitable compensation as contemplated
in section 123(4) was paid in respect of such expropriation, will exclude this
avenue for use by any whites whose farms were expropriated for the use of
Blacks.' 2
A.

THE FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMISSION

The legislature will not only establish the commission, but will also provide
that the commission be competent. The commission will have the power to investigate the merits of any claims as well as mediate and settle disputes. Its reports
regarding unsettled claims can be submitted as evidence to a court of law.' 22
Court orders in response to a submission by the commission may differ according to whether the land in question is still in possession of the state or privately
held.
When the land in question is in the possession of the state and the state certifies
that the restoration of the right in question is feasible, the court may, subject to
subsection (4), order the state to restore the relevant right to the claimant.
If the land is in the possession of a private owner and the state certifies that
the acquisition of such land by the state is feasible, the court may, subject to
subsection (4), order the state to purchase or expropriate such land and restore
the relevant right to the claimant. Any expropriation will by necessity be governed
by subsection 28(3), which forms part of the bill of rights. Expropriation shall
be permissible for public purposes 3 only and shall be subject to the payment
of agreed compensation. If an agreement regarding compensation cannot be
reached, a court of law, taking into account all just and equitable factors, including
the use of the property, the history of its acquisition, its market value, the value
of the investments in it by those affected, and the interests of those affected,
must determine the compensation payable. Some of these factors are actually
echoed in the wording of section 123(2): The court shall not issue an order under

120. This is the date of the commencement of the Black Land Act of 1913, erroneously referred
to as June 13, 1913, by Basson. BASSON, supra note 108, at 43 n.120.
121. In this section, the Expropriation Act, of 1975 shall include any expropriation law repealed
by that Act. Expropriation Act, supra note I11.
122. The procedures to be followed for dealing with claims, in terms of this section, shall be as
prescribed by or under the Act. Expropriation Act, supra note 111.
123. This is the crux of the wording of the present Expropriation Act. Id.
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subsection (1)(b) unless it is just and equitable to do so, taking into account all
relevant factors, including the history of the dispossession, the hardship caused,
the use to which the property is being put, the history of its acquisition by the
owner, the interests of the owner and others affected by any expropriation, and
the interests of the dispossessed-provided that any expropriation under subsection (1)(b) shall be subject to the payment of compensation calculated in the
manner provided for in section 28(3).
If the state certifies that any restoration in terms of subsection 123(1)(a) or
any acquisition in terms of subsection 123(l)(b) is not feasible, or if the claimant
instead of the restoration of the right prefers alternative relief, the court may
order the state to give the claimant alternative state-owned land; to compensate
24
the claimant; or to grant the claimant alternative relief.
Subsection 123(4) provides that the compensation referred to in subsection (3)
shall be determined by the court as being just and equitable, taking into account
the circumstances that prevailed at the time of the dispossession and all such
other factors as may be prescribed by the Act referred to in section 121(1),
including any compensation that was paid upon such dispossession. If the court
grants the claimant the relief contemplated in subsection (1) or (3), it shall take
into account, and, when appropriate, make an order with regard to, any compensation that the claimant received upon the dispossession of the right in question.
The ills of apartheid must be rectified, but at the same time the matter of
restitution of land must be dealt with in a manner that affords legal certainty in
relation to land tenure.
At the end of May 1994, a furor broke out regarding trust land of the Zulu
nation that was legally transferred two days before the Constitution became effective from the Kwazulu government to a private trust of which the Zulu king is
the sole trustee. According to South African law, the land is no longer held by
the state, but forms part of the private property of the Zulu king. The status of
the Zulu king was the subject of a last-minute alteration to the Constitution just
three days before its commencement. The appointed cabinet committee's solution
for this 1.2 million hectares of Zulu land held in private trust by the Zulu king
will give an early indication of the manner in which the new government will
abide by the legal principles contained in the Constitution.
V. Conclusion
The success or failure of the first steps by the South African peoples on the
road to a truly democratic society will depend not so much on the wording or
paragraphs of the new Constitution as on the manner in which the Constitution
moves the spirit and will of the very people governed according to the constitutional norms. Success presupposes a certain amount of political maturity and
124. CACHALIA ET AL., supra note 81, at 96-99.
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acknowledgment of the differences between the peoples. The best constitution
is of no use or effect if ignored by the subjects. South African people must be
educated about the value of abiding by the Constitution. "The content of the
a living reality for every citizen of the world from
Declaration [must be2 made]
5
up."
youth
his very
The history of post-independent Africa reveals an almost total failure of constitutionalism as exhibited by the lack of respect for constitutions or constitutional
documents and the rule of law. Wamala1 26 concludes that "Africa does not seem
127
The traditional
to be capable of upholding the sanctity of her constitutions.,
attitude that nothing may hamper or restrict the ruler bodes ill for the hope of
stemming arbitrary decisions and power wielding.
The role of the judiciary, and thus the lawyers, is merely to guide and balance
the different aspirations and rights of the people in an harmonious way. 28Enforcement of the fine sounding principles enshrined in the new Interim Constitution
will be the task of the judiciary, from the lower courts, through the supreme court,
and up to the Constitutional Court. This enforcement presupposes a fraternity of
academically well-trained lawyers and judges who are independent and above
the temptations of bribery. No government or political lobby should compromise
constitutional enforcement for the sake of short-term gains of popularity with
their constituency by changing the color of the judges.
Good will and bona fide citizens are present in the people of South Africa to
make the Constitution successful, if left alone by international interventionists.
We lawyers are prepared and able to smooth the transition in such a way that,
thanks to the checks and balances built into the Constitution, no single party
should be able to enforce its will onto the rest or any minority. The majority
are as eager as the minority that the Constitution should work because South
Africa is most probably the last place in Africa where the African people can
demonstrate their ability to succeed at running a country along modern, acceptable
lines.
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